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A.: Workmen's Compensation--Effective Date of Modification of Award

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
EFFECTIVE DATE OF MODIFIWoREx N's COMPENSATION cATION OF AWARD. - Claimant was injured and awarded a 50%

permanent partial disability rating. Final payment thereunder
was made on July 16, 1937. On April 2, 1938, he filed a petition
asking for a total and permanent disability rating. He continued
to work until June 24, 1939, in another capacity and received
wages in excess of the sum he would have received as compensation.
On June 24, 1939, the compensation appeal board increased claimant's award to a total and permanent disability rating and directed
compensation to be paid beginning as of that date. Claimant appealed, contending that the award should have commenced as of
July 17, 1937. Held, two judges dissenting, that the compensation
commissioner or appeal board may in the discretion of either provide that payments shall begin at the date of the order finding the
increased percentage of disability. Burgess v. State Compensation
Commissioner.'
Where the award is modified there are four possible dates that
could be used as the beginning point of the new award: (1) date
of last payment of the preceding award;2 (2) date of actual increase of disability; (3) date of filing of application; and (4) date
of entry of order.
The Kentucky, Virginia and Georgia statutes specify that no
review shall touch any money award already paid.3 The Kentucky
court, in interpreting its statute to authorize payment from the
date of filing of application, recognizes that the result it reaches is
not always just, but to achieve uniformity it balances the severity
of the result in cases where disability has increased against the
likelihood of equal harshness if the award were retroactive, and
the disability had decreased. 4 There is nothing in the statute,
though, that prevents the award from having a retroactive effect
if it embraces a period during which no money payments have
'5 S. E. (2d) 804 (W. Va. 1939). If the new award wore for anything
short of total permanent disability the date of its beginning would not be
important, as payment would necessarily be made for a designated number of
weeks. In the case of total permanent disability, payment is for life. W. VA.
CODE (Miehie, Supp. 1939) c. 23, art. 4, § 6.
2 The preceding award ordinarily would date back to the time of the original

injury.
3 VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1936) § 1887: "No such review shall affect such
award as regards any monies paid." KY. REV. STATS. (Baldwin, 1936) § 4902:
shall not affect the previous order or award
"Review under this section ....
GA. CODr (Harrison, 1933) § 114as to any sums already paid thereunder."
709: "No such review shall affect such award as regards any moneys paid."
4 Lincoln Coal Co. v. Watts, 275 Ky. 130, 120 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1936).
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been made.* The Georgia statute is construed to make the order
effective as of the time entered." The Virginia decisions are imperative in their holding that no award shall be retroactive. 7
The statutes of Oregon and Arizonas adopt the third possible
date, i. e., date of filing of application, and thus combine the beauty
of simplicity with the injustice that necessarily emanates from miflexibility. No leeway is allowed for extenuating circumstances.'
A more liberal attitude is evidenced by the Micbigan court
which has allowed compensation from the date of inability to work
though the application for a new award was not filed until some
years later.10 It is a full recognition of the fact that delay may be
due to good faith. However, the court also recognizes the right
of the board to allow compensation to date from the filing of the
new application where testimony as to the commencement of the
added disability is conflicting and unsatisfactory. 1
The West Virginia statute involved provides that "In all
cases where compensation is awarded or increased, the amouht
thereof shall be calculated and paid from the date of disability." 1 2
The dissenting judges in the Burgess case believe that the language
bars any discretionary power in the commissioner or appeal board
and that a subsequent award must begin at the time of the expiration of the last preceding award, i.e., from the date of disability.
5 Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v. Jones, 114 Ky. 775, 283 S. W. 1067 (1926).
a South v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 47, 146 S. E.45 (1928).
7 Bristol Door & Lumber Co. v. Hinkle, 157 Va. 474, 161 S. E. 902 (1932)
(the new award was effective as of the day of application); Gray v. Underwood Bros., 164 Va. 344, 180 S. E. 317 (1935) (new award can be made
effective as of time entered). Here entertaining of an application to review
compensation on grounds of changed condition before expiration of outstanding award was reversible error.
8ORE. STATS. (Supp. 1935) § 49-1836 ("No increase or rearrangement in
compensation shall be operative for any period prior to application therefor ");
ARIZ. REV. CODE (Supp. 1937) § 1447 ("No increase in compensation shall be
operative for any period prior to application therefor").
9 Chebot v. State Industrial Ace. Comm., 106 Ore. 660, 212 Pac. 792 (1923);
Wise v. Six Companies, Inc., 43 Ariz. 24, 28 P. (2d) 1007 (1934); Zagar" v.
Industrial Comm., 40 Ariz. 479, 14 P. (2d) 472 (1932).
10 Giampi v. Chrysler Corp., 272 Mfich. 327, 262 N. W. 259 (1935).
1 Louwaert v. D. Graff & Sons, 256 Mich. 387, 240 N. W. 44 (1932).
12 W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1939) c. 23, art. 4, § 18.
isThe preceding award would ordinarily date back to the original injury.
W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 23, art. 4, § 6 provides that 66 2/3% of the
average weekly earnings will be the weekly compensation allowed. The period
for which the award is given varies with the percentage of disability, i. e., for a
5% disability, compensation is allowed for 20 weeks; for a 40% disability,
compensation is allowed for 160 weeks; for an 80% disability compensation is
paid for 320 weeks (four weeks' compensation is allowed for every percentage
of disability). When the injury is classed as an 85% or greater disability, the
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356.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
In the instant case evidence of actual employment by the claimant during the period between the last payment and the settlement
of his claim by the appeal board is important. Though his ability
to work in some capacity does not always bar his right to additional compensation, 4 it is an important evidentiary fact that should
be considered by the commissioner or board in setting the date of
actual increased disability. Since the employee has been working
he is not prejudiced by making his payments begin at the date of
award. In the ordinary situation where the claimant has been
unable to work, and his disability has increased it could readily be
assumed that the legislature meant the order to date from actual
disability, and not from the date the award is made. If the latter
were true, the employee might be forced to lose compensation for
the period involved in litigation, it being presumed that he did not
apply in anticipation of later total disability, but under the stress
of its immediate presence. The holding of the Burgess case does not
necessarily mean that an increase in compensation will always date
from the day of entry of the award, and is not inconsistent with
the view that usually the date of the last payment of preceding
award will prevail.
If the object of the statute is to provide the injured workman
with suitable compensation it would appear eminently fair that the
increased award be allowed from the date of actual change in condition, regardless of the fact that application may not be immediately made. Each such award would then, as in the present case,
be judged on its own merits. It is obvious that the workman, in
spite of the presumption that he knows the law, is frequently unaware of his full rights. He should not be punished for his understandable ignorance of them.
A. A. A.
employee receives 66 2/3% of his average weekly earnings for the remainder
of his life. In the instant case if the award is not allowed to date back to the
period of last payment of the preceding award, there is a period of approximately two years during which claimant will have received no compensation.
14 Gay Coal & Coke Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 2 S. E. (2d)
265 (W. Va. 1939).
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